Inicialmente, o texto indaga sobre o significado do exercício do filósofo social; pretende também localizar as origens do debate moderno sobre ‘subjetividade’ no pensamento filosófico e social. As idéias norteadoras de Kant, se situam na confluência e na disjunção entre razão (conhecimento) e subjetividade (moral). A partir dessa referência, o debate entre alguns pensadores considerados como pós-modernos (Badiou e Zizek), por um lado, e por outro Castoriadis que recusa esta nomenclatura, vão derivando idéias novas sobre ‘sujeito’ e ‘verdade’. Esse debate (...) não é sem conseqüências para a teoria sociológica que assume para si o desafio de introduzir a categoria de ‘sujeito’ em seus cânones (Touraine). As reflexões de Stengers servem também para questionar e aproximar as práticas da produção do conhecimento e dos discursos científicos. Finalmente, restam desafios para se pensar teorias e práticas sócio-ambientais à luz desses conceitos apresentados ao longo do texto. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por finalidade apresentar alguns aspectos relacionados à questão do corpo na filosofia de Michel Foucault. Para isso, a nossa investigação se dará em dois momentos: no primeiro momento analisaremos a relação do corpo com a medicina para percebermos como a visão deste saber sobre o corpo se modificou a partir do século XVII, veremos que há uma relação entre o olhar médico e o corpo em si. O segundo momento será dedicado a uma explicitação acerca da relação (...) entre poder e corpo; será possível notar que as práticas subjetivas são determinadas a partir de dispositivos culturais próprios de uma realidade cultural. No esteio disso, o poder disciplinar, que tem o seu ideal no panóptico, foi elemento preponderante para o projeto de domesticação dos corpos. Enfim, não é possível afirmar uma teoria sobre o corpo, no pensamento do filósofo francês, pois a sua investigação traz à tona a complexidade das estruturas culturais que determinam as diversas percepções a respeito desse corpo. (shrink)

As considerações que faremos neste artigo vai analisar como o metabolismo se torna um mecanismo que representa o primeiro gesto de liberdade da vida na filosofia de Hans Jonas. A centralidade da discussão está no fato de que a vida é um processo de manutenção de si onde a liberdade está presente desde as estruturas mais simples do organismo às mais desenvolvidas. O nosso objetivo é o de mostrar, a partir de uma análise das ideias de liberdade e necessidade, como (...) a vida se abre para uma transcendência ou, tecnicamente falando, para uma nova ontologia. (shrink)

Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, (...) are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.

How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...) principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)

This study aims to examine the ethical decision-making model proposed by Schwartz, where we consider the factors of non-rationality and aspects that affect ethical judgments of auditors to make the decision to blow the whistle. In this paper, we argue that the intention of whistleblowing depends on ethical awareness and ethical judgment as well as there is a mediation–moderation due to emotion and perceived moral intensity of auditors. Data were collected using an online survey with 162 external auditors who worked (...) on audit firms in Indonesia as well as 173 internal auditors working in the manufacturing and financial services. The result of multigroup analysis shows that emotion can mediate the relationship between EAW and EJW. The nature of this relationship is more complex and then tested by adding moderating variables using consistent partial least squares approach. We found that EMT and PMI can improve the relationship between ethical judgments and whistleblowing intentions. These findings indicate that internal auditors are more likely to blow the whistle than external auditors; and reporting wrongdoing internally and anonymously are the preferred way of professional accountants to blow the whistle in Indonesia. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, despite the progress made in recent years, virtue argumentation theory still lacks a more systematic acknowledgment of other-regarding virtues. A fuller recognition of such virtues not only enriches the field of research of virtue argumentation theory in significant ways, but also allows for a richer and more intuitive view of the virtuous arguer. A fully virtuous arguer, it is argued, should care to develop both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. He should be concerned both with (...) his own development as an arguer and with helping other arguers in that regard. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 257-261, October 2022. Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics (...) of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes. (shrink)

O curso de Língua Brasileira de Sinais – Libras, níveis Básico e Intermediário (2020-2021), é um projeto da Secretaria Municipal de Educação de Ilhéus – SEDUC/Ilhéus (Estado da Bahia), em colaboração com o Centro de Referência à Inclusão Escolar – CRIE. Embora já existisse na modalidade presencial desde 2008, o curso na modalidade a distância foi lançado na ocasião do seminário “Setembro Azul”, em setembro de 2020, e foi planejado para atender em média a 200 cursistas. Influenciados pelos valores da (...) Educação Inclusiva, os organizadores destinaram o curso à comunidade ouvinte: professores, gestores, supervisores, orientadores, profissionais não docentes bem, como os familiares de pessoas surdas. Este artigo procura, de um lado, analisar como se deu a distribuição das vagas nas escolas e, de outro, a motivação principal dos cursistas a seguirem as aulas. Desse modo, questiona-se o nível de inclusão da comunidade escolar nos cursos de Libras, demonstrando os principais problemas e desafios da administração municipal. A metologia utilizada foi qualitativa, com a aplicação de questionários; e quatitativa, por meio da análise de arquivos inéditos dos setores da atual gestão da SEDUC/Ilhéus. Como resultado, a pesquisa revela que os cursistas (professores e funcionários não-docentes) não trabalham em escolas com alunos surdos matriculados, o que demonstra que a SEDUC/Ilhéus deve rever a lógica de distribuição de vagas. (shrink)

A pandemia da COVID-19 causou uma completa modificação nas formas de interação e comportamento social, visto que a contenção do vírus tornou-se prioridade mundial. O Estado, junto à medicina, passou a determinar os protocolos sanitários seguidos pela comunidade. A partir da indagação do filósofo Giorgio Agamben acerca da facilidade na qual uma sociedade permitiu considerar-se contagiada e entendendo como um período de calamidade deflagra a fragilidade da racionalidade científica diante da demanda por cura, neste artigo objetivou-se analisar se a medicina (...) tem respondido às demandas místicas a ela solicitadas, ou mesmo, se tem forjado demandas mistificadoras que reforçam seu lugar de poder social. Para tal, notas e documentos e posicionamentos de figuras políticas e instituições médicas brasileiras estarão aqui postos em pauta como vitrine que permite a análise da presença do caráter místico no discurso da medicina. É trazida aqui a oportunidade de ponderar as consequências decorrentes da ausência de questionamento acerca da cientificidade das instituições médicas e de suas influências na sociedade contemporânea. A exploração abrange não apenas o funcionamento baseado em conhecimento, mas também ressalta a influência da fé. Portanto, é um convite à reflexão sobre como a prática médica nos convida ao apego da crença na ciência. (shrink)

My starting point in this paper is the artistic structures of the Renaissance. Resorting to what I call an epistemology of blindness, I set out to identify the limits of representation in modern science. This epistemology applies to different sciences in different degrees. I argue that the degree is particularly high in the case of mainstream economics. At the end of the paper I indicate some possible ways of advancing from an epistemology of blindness toward an epistemology of seeing.

Introduction -- Function and destiny -- What's the good of thinking? -- Rationality, individual and collective -- Irrationality.

This paper intends to redeem, even modestly, the temporality and the narrativity present in the Discourse on the Method, and thus, to situate them in relation to the Cartesian project of legitimizing its conception of science and philosophy – step that marks his metaphysical turn given the condemnation of Galileo in 1633. Complementing and deepening this key of reading of the small essay of Descartes, we will trace a brief analysis of the philosophical meaning of the figure of the Journey (...) – present in an important way in the body of the text. In this spirit, our proposal is to understand how the aesthetic dimension of this Descartes’s work dialogues with its philosophical dimension. (shrink)

The question What is an individual? goes back beyond Aristotle’s discussion of substance to the Ionians’ preoccupation with the paradox of change -- the fact that if anything changes it must stay the same. Mere reflection on this fact and the common-sense notion of a countable thing yields a concept of a “minimal individual”, which is particular (a logical matter) specific (a taxonomic matter), and unique (an evaluative empirical matter). Individuals occupy space, and therefore might be dislodged. Even minimal individuals, (...) therefore (Strawsonian individual or Aristotelian substance) already contain the potential for competition or conflict. What is added by biology to this basic notion? It emerges from some recent work on the evolution of metazoan animals that individuals as we know them are minimal individuals towhich four features have been added, and which appear to be inseparable: differentiated multicellularity; sexual reproduction; segregation of germ from somatic cells; and obligatory death. Whether or not individuals are to be counted as units of selection, they are not the beneficiaries of natural selection. (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende resgatar o debate entre Richard Rorty e Nancy Fraser, ocorrido no início da década de 1990, especificamente a partir do texto Feminismo e Pragmatismo apresentado na Tanner Lectures on Human Value. Nesta conferência o filósofo discorreu sobre a possibilidade de conciliação entre o seu pragmatismo e o feminismo. Rorty aborda o feminismo enquanto autocriação da mulher através da “redescrição” mediante a manifestação poética, onde o filósofo encara as feministas como criadoras do novo. Em seguida, exporemos a (...) crítica de Fraser, que trabalha sobre a proposta apresentada pelo pragmatista e que oferece suas próprias ideias dentro de uma concepção do feminismo como movimento democrático de massa. Ao final, uma breve avaliação das implicações das críticas e sugestões apresentadas por Rorty ao feminismo e também da resposta de Fraser. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, truth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

Even though the university has the potential to help humanity in what amounts to a paradigmatic transition, it has been very restrictive and very selective in the kinds of knowledges it validates. In fact, the kinds of knowledges in which it has excelled are those most responsible for the paradigmatic crisis in which humanity finds itself. In a nutshell, the paradigmatic change calls for cognitive justice, justice for the different ways of knowing that circulate in society. Cognitive justice is the (...) polar opposite of ‘anything goes’. The assumption is that there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice, justice among knowledges. Looking back, while privileging one specific kind of knowledge and, indeed, granting it a cognitive monopoly, the university has been the privileged site for producing and legitimating cognitive injustice. As a result, the immense epistemic diversity of the world has been ignored or suppressed. In the following, I identify the problem and the promise for overcoming it. (shrink)

À quoi bon la pensée? Pour de nombreux chercheurs, inspirés par les théories évolutionnistes, la pensée réfléchie est utile à notre espèce. Elle lui confère des avantages importants et contribue à son succès reproductif. Pourtant ses avantages ne sont pas si évidents. La pensée ne figure ni dans les mécanismes de l'évolution qui ont façonné la vie, ni parmi les procédés dont se servent la plupart des organismes pour s'y maintenir. Dans Évolution et rationalité, Ronald de Sousa montre que, (...) pour comprendre les avantages de la pensée réfléchie, il faut changer nos présupposés relatifs à la rationalité et reconnaître la multiplicité de ses dimensions. La rationalité ne nous sert pas seulement à avoir des croyances vraies et à agir de manière efficace dans un environnement changeant. Elle nous aide à gérer nos plaisirs et nos peines dans le temps et nous permet d'envisager des situations qui n'existent pas. En général, le statut de la rationalité comme ensemble de capacités ayant évolué dans le cours de l'histoire naturelle de notre espèce, passant des tropismes aux désirs et de la détection à la représentation, n'a pas été pris suffisamment au sérieux. Suivre ce processus d'évolution de la rationalité permet de comprendre comment elle est devenue une norme, mais aussi pourquoi il lui arrive aussi souvent d'échouer. Ronald de Sousa a profondément modifié nos façons de concevoir les émotions. Avec Évolution et rationalité, il pourrait avoir une influence aussi décisive sur nos façons de concevoir la rationalité. (shrink)

This is a Big Book from one of Canada's preeminent philosophers. It aims at nothing less than to define what characterizes modernity, and then to tell us what is wrong with it. Like many a Big Book, it is predictably full of interesting things, and equally predictably disappointing, not to say feeble, in some of the central theses for which it argues. But then what more, in philosophy, can we really expect? It's what we tell our students: you don't have (...) to be right, and you don't have to make me agree with you, but you do have to produce interesting arguments and show that you have thought seriously about the issues. (shrink)

Do we love someone for their virtue, their beauty, or their moral or other qualities? Are love's characteristic desires altruistic or selfish? Are there duties of love? What do the sciences tell us about love? In this Very Short Introduction, Ronald de Sousa explores the different kinds of love, from affections to romantic love.

Résumé Cet article analyse les luttes menées par des casseuses de noix de babassu pour leurs territoires dans l’État de Maranhão, au Brésil. L’analyse est basée sur les réflexions de deux femmes noires casseuses de noix de babassu et sur les témoignages de Maria do Rosário et Rosalva Gomes. Il est possible de problématiser les processus d’organisation des luttes collectives des casseuses de babassu du Maranhão et la manière dont ces femmes ont résisté à la violence, à la fois sur (...) les plans personnel et communautaire. (shrink)

Neste artigo, pretendo oferecer algumas razões para se dizer que Aristóteles sustenta a tese de que a εὐδαιμονία não apenas oferece o critério normativo que orienta a instituição e a reforma de regimes que estão aquém do melhor regime, como também é aquilo que é visado pela instituição e pela reforma destes regimes, pois o melhor regime não é, para Aristóteles, senão o regime no qual a εὐδαιμονία pode ser alcançada em máximo grau (cf. Pol. VII.13 1332a4-7).

This article has two purposes. First, it aims to put the development of the World Social Forum within a broad theoretical and historical context. Specifically, my goal is to understand the WSF in relation to the crises of left thinking and practice of the last thirty or forty years. Second, it offers an analysis of some recent debates about the future of the WSF. It raises questions concerning its organizational makeup and asks whether it should continue as it is, or (...) rather give way to other kinds of initiatives and struggles. Against critics such as Walden Bello, I argue that the WSF should continue and, given certain organizational changes, will contribute to the theory and practice of left movements throughout the world in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Emotions are Janus‐faced. They tell us something about the world, and they tell us something about ourselves. This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truths of emotions, one of which is about self and the other about conditions in the world. On some views, the latter comes by means of the former. Insofar as emotions manifest our inner life, however, we are more inclined to speak of authenticity rather than truth. What is the (...) difference? We need to distinguish the criteria of correspondence or appropriateness suitable for authenticity from those that embody the criterion of truth. Furthermore there is also a question about the transitions – among states of mind, and between states of mind and behaviour – that emotions encourage. This realm of transitions concerns rationality. After sketching the relevant distinctions, I will endeavour to justify the view that emotions should be appraised in terms of all three terms. (shrink)

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...) of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony. (shrink)

Resumo: O objetivo do texto consiste em propor uma perspectiva hermenêutica acerca da relação entre as noções de beatitudo e religio na Summa theologiae de Tomás de Aquino. A religião não é considerada por Tomás como virtude teologal, mas sim como virtude moral. Por outro lado, argumenta-se que as contribuições neoplatônicas de Dionísio e Agostinho são fundamentais no sentido de articular a busca da perfecta beatitudo do ser humano na visão da essência de Deus.

For those of us who are sympathetic to the research program of cognitive science, it is especially useful to face the deepest and sharpest critic of that program. Charles Taylor, who defines himself as a ‘hedgehog’ whose ‘single rather tightly related agenda’ fits into a very ancient and rather elusive debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism, may well be that critic. My ambition in this paper is to distill Taylor’s central objection to the cognitive science approach to agency and the self (...) as it is expressed throughout Human Agency and Language. After trying to set out the core of this objection, I want to remark on some rather curious aspects of the dispute of which it is a part, and then sketch, in relation to one or two examples, what I take to be the most promising line of resistance to Taylor’s attack. I conclude with a proposal as to how Taylor may – narrowly – escape one logical consequence of his position, according to which he should stop knocking the cognitive science program and instead go to work building a robot. (shrink)

As cartas sobre A educação estética do homem (1795), para além de um tratado estético, são também um manifesto político – essa é a perspectiva que direciona e justifica este trabalho. Logo nas primeiras cartas, Schiller deixa claro que a pesquisa dedicada ao Belo e à Arte se relaciona intimamente com os problemas da felicidade e da política; afirma, com todas as letras, que o caminho trilhado através do problema estético conduz à resolução prática do problema político. A partir da (...) análise dos principais elementos que compõem a reflexão expressa na obra destacada, pretende-se demonstrar que o ponto de partida e chegada da filosofia schilleriana é a sociabilidade entre os homens. (shrink)

Femininity and whiteness dominate Western nursing, silencing ontologies and epistemologies that do not align with these dominant norms while perpetuating systemic racism and discrimination in nursing practice, education, research, nursing activism, and sociopolitical structures. We propose Black feminist thought as a praxis to decenter, deconstruct, and unseat these ideologies and systems of power. Drawing from the work of past and present Black feminist scholars, we examine the ontological and epistemological perspectives of Black feminist thought. These include (i) the uniqueness and (...) particular experiences of people, (ii) the acceptance of ontological and epistemological pluralism of truths and ways of knowing, and (iii) the mandate for equity in the health, social, political, and environmental structures of society. By focusing our attention on lived experiences and voices of those systematically excluded in nursing practice, education, research, and society, Black feminist thought offers an anticolonial, antiracist, and antidiscriminatory foundation for more effectively upholding nursing's disciplinary mandate for social justice and equity. (shrink)

Em 1869, em uma recomendação de livros de interesse para o público espírita, Allan Kardec escreveu que a “filosofia moral” do pastor americano William Ellery Channing era “o mais puro espiritismo”. Este artigo parte desse fato para efetuar uma análise das similaridades entre o pensamento de Kardec e o chamado cristianismo liberal (ou unitarismo) dos Estados Unidos, do qual Channing era o mais famoso representante na primeira metade do século XIX. Para isso, efetua-se, primeiro, uma definição do termo “cristianismo liberal”; (...) em seguida, traçam-se algumas de suas raízes intelectuais no pensamento cristão anglo-americano e, finalmente, comparam-se alguns elementos de sua versão do cristianismo com a leitura kardequiana dessa tradição religiosa por meio, principalmente, de um texto representativo de cada autor quanto a esse assunto, a saber: _Unitarian Christianity_, de 1819, e _O Evangelho segundo o Espiritismo_ (na versão definitiva de 1866). Ao fim, constata-se que algumas das teses e abordagens propostas por Kardec já circulavam há décadas no meio protestante americano, não se restringindo apenas à “filosofia moral”. (shrink)